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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ACCOMMODATING FAMILIES: USING THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT TO KEEP FAMILIES TOGETHER
SUSAN STEFAN*

I. INTRODUCTION
Years ago, when children were born with severe disabilities, especially
mental disabilities, they were likely to be institutionalized at birth or shortly
thereafter.1 When women with serious psychiatric disabilities who were
clients of the mental health or social service systems became pregnant, their
children were often taken away from them at birth and put up for adoption.2
For years, the social reality was that when one member of the family was
born with or developed a serious mental disability, the family did not stay
intact.3
Beginning in the 1970s, the dominant paradigm in disability policy
toward children and adults with mental disabilities began to change.4 The
* Center for Public Representation, Newton, Massachusetts. Much of the social science
research in this article was prepared by Sarah Weston, whose assistance and support was
invaluable: this article would not have been possible without her. I gratefully acknowledge the
groundbreaking work of Joanne Nicholson, Andrea Blanch, and the late Carol Mowbray.
This article is dedicated to the memory of my mother, Gabrielle Stefan.
1. See SARAH GEHLERT & TERI ARTHUR BROWNE, HANDBOOK OF HEALTH SOCIAL WORK 450
(2006); see generally EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, AMERICA’S WELFARE STATE: FROM ROOSEVELT TO
REAGAN (1991); see also U.S. Office of Special Education Programs, History: Twenty-Five
Years of Progress Educating Children with Disabilities Through IDEA, available at
www.ed.gov/policy/speced/leg/idea/history.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2009) (discussing
hundreds of thousands of children with disabilities living in institutions in the 1960s).
2. Walter E. Barton, Foreword to ROBERTA J. APFEL & MARYELLEN H. HANDEL, MADNESS AND
LOSS OF MOTHERHOOD: SEXUALITY, REPRODUCTION, AND LONG-TERM MENTAL ILLNESS, xv, xv,
(1993); Roberta G. Sands, The Parenting Experience of Low-Income Single Women with
Serious Mental Disorders, 76 FAMILIES IN SOC’Y: J. CONTEMP. HUMAN SERVICES 86, 86 (1995).
3. See Barton, supra note 2; see also Sands, supra note 2.
4. See VALERIE J. BRADLEY & JAMES KNOLL, SHIFTING PARADIGMS IN SERVICES TO PEOPLE WITH
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 3-5 (1990); David Mechanic & David A. Rochefort,
Deinstitutionalization: An Appraisal of Reform, 16 ANN. REV. SOC. 301, 301-04 (1990)
(discussing the history of deinstitutionalization and its effects); see generally Gerald N. Grob,
The Forging of Mental Health Policy in America: World War II to New Frontier, 42 J. HIST.
MED. & ALLIED SCI. 410 (1987) (discussing the historical shift in the treatment of individuals
with disabilities).
135

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

136

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 2:135

new framework went by different names in different fields, but its
overarching ideal was community integration and maintaining family
integrity. In education, children who had previously been expelled from
school for severe behavior problems were given services to keep them in
school if possible, a process known as “mainstreaming;”5 in residential
settings the goal was “deinstitutionalization;”6 in social services, it was called
“family preservation” or “family stabilization.”7 Even when a child was taken
out of a family, the goal was generally reunification with the family.8
Family integrity and family stabilization efforts focused principally
(although not entirely) on situations where the disabled member was the
child, not the parent.9 There has been a consensus for several decades in
public policy, the research literature, and advocacy efforts regarding the
benefits of keeping families intact when a child has a serious mental
disability, and the importance of providing the necessary services and
supports to parents, grandparents, and extended family members to ensure
that the child can remain with his or her family.10 More recently, advocacy
and public policy initiatives have attempted to ensure that parents will not be
required to forfeit custody of their mentally disabled children in order to
receive needed mental health services available only to children in state
custody.11 In the last several years, lawsuits have compelled states and cities

5. Conor B. McDonough, The Mainstreaming Requirement of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act in the Context of Autistic Spectrum Disorders, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1225, 1226 (2008); Leslie Reed, Is a Free Appropriate Public Education Really Free? How the
Denial of Expert Witness Fees Will Adversely Impact Children with Autism, 45 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 251, 266 (2008).
6. See Mechanic & Rochefort, supra note 4, at 303-04 (discussing the reasons for the
rise of deinstitutionalization); see also Lisa.L. Leitzell & David T. Somppi, Perspectives on
Group Homes, 4 J. Planning Literature 357, 372 (1989) (discussing the reasoning for
deinstitutionalization); THOMAS P. SMITH & MARTIN JAFFE, SITTING GROUP HOMES FOR
DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS, ch. 2, available at: www.mncdd.org/parallels2/pdf/86SGM-APS.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2009) (discussing literature promoting
deinstitutionalization).
7. Julie Odegard, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Creating “Family Values”
for Physically Disabled Parents, 11 LAW & INEQ. 533, 558 (1993).
8. See generally Lisette Austin, Giving the Family a Chance: Working Towards
Reunification, THE CONNECTION, Fall 2008, at 10, 10 (promoting family reunification efforts);
see also Odegard, supra note 7, at 558 (stating that “[b]ecause an essential goal of social
services is family preservation, the state has a duty to investigate services such as reunification
which will achieve that goal.”).
9. See, e.g., National Family Preservation Network, About NFPN, at www.nfpn.org/
about-nfpn.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2009) (explaining that the purpose of the National
Family Preservation Network is to “improve[] the well-being of children”).
10. Austin, supra note 8, at 10.
11. Lois A. Weithorn, Envisioning Second-Order Change in America’s Response to
Troubled and Troublesome Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1308 (2005); see generally
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to provide wraparound services for seriously emotionally disturbed children
in their homes under the Early Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment
(EPSDT) portion of Medicaid.12
Far more modest progress has been made with programs to help
parents (usually mothers) with mental disabilities keep their children. One of
the first such programs was the Thresholds Program in Chicago,13 and today
a small number of model programs exist across the country.14 Because of
funding and agency structures, however, family unification programs
targeted at families where one member has a disability are generally aimed
at helping the family in order to benefit a specific individual client, either the
child or the parent.15 It is rare for the entire family to be identified as the
client of a program.
During the same period of time in which wraparound and other models
of family-based care have developed to keep families intact, advocates have
used the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)16 to promote community
integration of adults with mental disabilities.17 In 1999, the Supreme
Court’s holding in Olmstead v. L.C., that unnecessary institutionalization
constituted segregation under the ADA,18 sparked a national effort to
maximize community placement and integration of adults with psychiatric
disabilities. Since then, a number of court cases have been brought aimed

Gwen Goodman, Accessing Mental Health Care for Children: Relinquishing Custody to Save
the Child, 67 ALBANY L. REV. 301 (2003); Tracy J. Simmons, Relinquishing Custody in
Exchange for Mental Healthcare Services: Undermining the Adoption and Safe Families Act’s
Promise of Reasonable Efforts Towards Family Preservation and Unification, 10 J. L. & FAM.
STUD. 377 (2008); Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Custody
Relinquishment to Obtain Mental Health Services for Children, at www.bazelon.org/issues/
children/custody/index.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2009).
12. See Rosie D. v. Romney, 401 F. Supp. 2d 18, 52 (D. Mass. 2006); Katie A. v. Bontá,
433 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1074-75 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
13. Thresholds Psychiatric Rehabilitation Ctrs., The Thresholds Mothers’ Project:
Overview, at www.thresholds.org/mothers.asp (last visited Feb. 29, 2009).
14. These programs are described in various places, including APFEL & HANDEL, supra,
including ROBERTA J. APFEL & MARYELLEN H. HANDEL, MADNESS AND LOSS OF MOTHERHOOD:
SEXUALITY, REPRODUCTION, AND LONG TERM MENTAL ILLNESS 163 (1993) and “Parental Mental
Illness” on the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services website, at http://dcfsweb
resource.prairienet.org/ras/mental.php (last visited Feb. 29, 2009). Because of the exigencies
of funding, some of these programs may no longer exist. The principles on which they
operate, however, remain constant: that both children and parents are better off if the family
remains together, with services that maximize their strengths and supports to assist them.
15. See Substance Abuse and Mental Health Servs. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., Critical Issues for Parents with Mental Illness and Their Families, at www.mental
health.samhsa.gov/publications/allpubs/KEN-01-0109/ch7.asp (last visited Feb. 29, 2009).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
17. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 600 (1999).
18. Id. at 599-601.
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at enforcing the finding in Olmstead that individuals should not have to give
up integrated life in a community setting in order to receive necessary
treatment for their disabilities.19
Despite obvious parallels between family integration and community
integration, efforts to use the ADA to keep families intact in the community
when one member of the family has a psychiatric disability have failed
almost completely.20 These cases have generally been brought on behalf of
an individual disabled parent in state court, claiming that a state social
services agency had an obligation to provide accommodations to the
disabled parent prior to terminating parental rights.21 Despite the fact that a
substantial number of families who are subject to termination proceedings
have at least one member with a psychiatric disability, both federal and state
courts have recoiled from suggestions that the ADA requires state agencies
to truly modify their practices, services, or training in recognition of this fact,
or to provide more than cursory accommodations (or, in some cases, any
accommodations at all) to keep families intact when one member has a
psychiatric disability.22 Some state courts have held that violations of the

19. See Frederick L. v. Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 364 F.3d 487 (3d Cir. 2004), vacated,
422 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2005); Pa. Protection and Advocacy, Inc. v. Pa. Dep’t of Public
Welfare, 402 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 2005); Arc of Washington v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 615 (9th
Cir. 2005); Messier v. Southbury Training School, 562 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D. Conn. 2008);
Martin v. Taft, 222 F. Supp. 2d 940 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
20. Theresa Glennon, Walking with Them: Advocating for Parents with Mental Illnesses in
the Child Welfare System, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 273, 275 (2003); Alexis C.
Collentine, Note, Respecting Intellectually Disabled Parents: A Call for Change in State
Termination of Parental Rights Statutes, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 535, 562 (2005); Sherry S.
Zimmerman, Annotation, Parents’ Mental Illness or Mental Deficiency as Ground for
Termination of Parental Rights—Applicability of Americans with Disabilities Act, 119 A.L.R. 351
(2004); Joanne Nicholson et al., The Prevalence of Parenthood in Adults with Mental Illness:
Implications for State and Federal Policymakers, Programs, and Providers, in MENTAL HEALTH,
UNITED STATES, 2002, at 133 (Ronald W. Manderscheid & Marilyn J. Henderson eds., U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Pub., 2004) [hereinafter Nicholson et al., The Prevalence of
Parenthood].
21. See, e.g., J.H. v. Dep’t of Health & Social Servs., 30 P.3d 79, 86 (Alaska 2001);
Collins v. Dep't of Human Servs., CA02-653, 2003 Ark. App. LEXIS 52, at *1 (Ark. App. Jan.
22, 2003); Greenfield v. Dep't of Human Servs., CA02-525, 2002 Ark. App. LEXIS 600, at *1
(Ark. App. Oct. 30, 2002); Parker v. Dep't of Human Servs., CA96-155, 1997 Ark. App.
LEXIS 53 at *1 (Ark. App. Feb. 5, 1997); In re Anthony P., 84 Cal. App. 4th 1112, 1115
(App. Ct. 2000).
22. Some courts have held that no services were required because a parent’s mental
illness would preclude her from being able to parent, or that the ADA does not apply to
termination proceedings, and therefore no accommodations are required. See In re B.S., 693
A.2d 716, 720 (Vt. 1997); In re Antony B., 735 A.2d 893, 899 (Conn. App. 1999). Other
courts have held that the ADA does not affect or increase the duty imposed by statute to
provide reunification services, so that parents with disabilities are not entitled to any more or
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ADA cannot be used as a defense to termination of parental rights and have
instructed parents to bring their claims in federal courts.23 Some federal
courts have held that they cannot resolve ADA claims, either because they
do not have the jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to hear
appeals of final state decisions regarding parental rights, or because they
invoke the Younger abstention doctrine.24 Other courts have held that
parents who asked for accommodations once termination proceedings were
underway asked too late;25 still others have held that parents did receive
accommodations and were simply unable to benefit from them.26
The central argument of this article is that attempts to apply the ADA to
keep families together when one member has a psychiatric disability have
used the wrong strategy, at the wrong time, and have employed the wrong
argument. Individual claims on behalf of a disabled parent at the time of
termination proceedings asking for reasonable accommodations have failed
in scores of cases across the country in different jurisdictions and before
different judges.
Instead of case-by-case adjudication, disability advocates should bring
systemic ADA discrimination cases seeking to expose and confront the
exclusion and discrimination inherent in the operation of the interlocking
mental health, social service, and legal systems. Those frameworks,
presumptions, and structures essentially erase the possibility of keeping the
family together, affirmatively undermine family integrity, and create barriers,
burdens, and obstacles to people with psychiatric disabilities remaining with
their families. Thus, by the time of the individual termination proceedings,
the termination outcome is often predetermined.27

different services from parents who are not disabled. Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550 (6th
Cir. 2000; In re Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d 243, 245-46 (Ct. App. Wis. 1994).
23. In re Terry, 610 N.W.2d 563, 570 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); In re Anthony P., 84 Cal.
App. 4th 1112, 1116 (App. Ct. 2000); Stone v. Daviess County Div. of Child and Fam.
Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. App. 1995); In re B.K.F., 704 So.2d 314, 317 (La. App. 1994);
In re B.S. 693 A.2d 716 (Vt. 1997).
24. Miller v. Nichols, 2009 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 1533, at *9-*12, *16 (D.Me. Jan. 9, 2009);
Hilger v. Mink, No. CV 01-1132-AS, 2002 WL 31441221, at *1 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2002); see
also Burgess v. Carmichael, No. 99-17540, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 11102, at **3 n.1 (9th
Cir. June 7, 2002).
25. In re C.M., 526 N.W. 2d 562, 566 (Iowa App. 1994).
26. Bartell v. Lohiser, 12 F. Supp. 2d 640, 648 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff’d, 215 F.3d 550
(6th Cir. 2000); In re Angel B., 659 A.2d 277, 279 (Me. 1995); In re C.M., 526 N.W.2d at
566.
27. It is true that some parents abandon their children or prefer to see them
institutionalized. See Martin v. Voinovich, 840 F. Supp. 1175, 1184 n.15 (S.D. Ohio 1993)
(involving a father who stated that his disabled son should remain in a nursing home the
father did not see or correspond with him for over twenty years). Some older children who
have lived with their natural families express a desire to be taken from their family and
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The attitudes and assumptions of social service agencies and the legal
system mirror in many ways the attitudes and assumptions applied to the
parenting capacities of people with physical disabilities. Until relatively
recently, judges and social service agencies simply did not believe that
people who were, for example, blind, deaf, or wheelchair bound could
adequately parent a child.28 These social service agencies and family court
judges believed that certain physical disabilities completely precluded
successful parenting, and the same is true today for psychiatrically disabled
parents. Asking for reasonable accommodations, which requires the agency
and court to believe that the barriers to successful parenting can be
alleviated by rearranging certain aspects of service delivery, flies in the face
of the underlying assumption that the disability itself fundamentally precludes
parenting at all.
In addition, it is worthwhile to explore the application of the Olmstead
integration holding to efforts to keep families together when one member
has a disability. This article argues that family integration is not only a
natural corollary to community integration, it is a fundamental component
of community integration. Community integration (people with disabilities
living in the community) is a meaningless concept without family integration
(people with disabilities living in intact families). Furthermore, to the extent
that family integration and community integration are separate concepts,
this article argues that the language and logic of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Olmstead should apply to family integration as much as it
applies to community integration, and for many of the same reasons.
Section II of this article will set out research findings reflecting that the
psychiatric disability of one member of a family affects all members of the
family, that the solution to the problems that families face when one
member has a psychiatric disability is to assist the family rather than (literally)
dismember it, and that the best way to provide this assistance is to the family
as a whole. Section III will review the history of federal anti-discrimination
law, including Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,29 and its applications to
family integrity. I will focus on several early cases whose significant
implications have been lost over the years: the far-sighted district court

adopted. See J.T. v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 947 S.W. 2d 761, 764 (Ark. 1997). This article
is not about those families. It is about families with a disabled member who want to stay
together when the state seeks termination because of its judgment that the disability of one
member means that the family as a unit should be dissolved, as opposed to assisted with its
deficits and accommodated with its imperfections.
28. Michael Ashley Stein, Mommy Has a Blue Wheelchair: Recognizing the Parental Rights
of Individuals with Disabilities, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1069, 1069-70 (1994); Odegard, supra
note 7, at 534.
29. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973).
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decisions in Homeward Bound v. Hissom30 and Joyner v. Dumpson.31
Section III will also examine the integration mandate and ignore Olmstead
v. L.C., and argue that the language and logic of each of these cases
supports the proposition that efforts to keep families with a disabled member
together are required by current anti-discrimination law. Section IV of this
article will discuss why efforts to use the ADA to maintain family integrity
have, for the most part, failed. I contend that lawyers have concentrated
too much on individual cases claiming discrimination on the basis of
disability, and not enough on the failures of state human service systems to
overcome structural prejudices against people with psychiatric disabilities as
parents.
Finally, Section V will discuss potential models for ADA cases on behalf
of families with a psychiatrically disabled family member. I argue that
pursuing community integration without maintaining family integrity is, in
some ways, a meaningless concept that perpetuates discriminatory images
of people with psychiatric disabilities as disconnected from intimate
relationships and incapable of successful parenting, who can never be seen
as truly a part of the community.
II. THE INTERFAMILY AND INTERGENERATIONAL IMPACT OF MENTAL DISABILITY
The majority of people who suffer from mental illness over their lifetimes
are parents.32 Over one million parents of children under eighteen have a
serious psychiatric disorder.33 In fact, people with serious mental illness
“may be at least as likely, if not more likely” to have children than people
without serious mental illness.34
Most parents with mental illness escape the attention of child welfare
authorities; however, “those that do are likely to face other serious
challenges as well: poverty, single parenthood, few family or other social
supports, and domestic violence or childhood sexual abuse.”35 Intervention
from state social service agencies and dissolution of the family is often the

30. Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Hissom Mem’l Ctr., No. 85-C-437-E, 1987 WL
27104 (N.D. Okla. July, 24, 1987).
31. Joyner v. Dumpson, 533 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev’d, 712 F.2d 770 (2d
Cir. 1983) (citing misapprehension of the scope of Section 504; this misapprehension was
corrected by the U.S. Supreme Court less than five years later in Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287 (1985)).
32. Nicholson et al., The Prevalence of Parenthood, supra note 20, at 120, 128;
Kathleen Biebel et al., The Responsiveness of State Mental Health Authorities to Parents with
Mental Illness, 32 ADMIN. & POL’Y IN MENTAL HEALTH 31, 31-32 (2004).
33. Glennon, supra note 20, at 273.
34. Nicholson et al., The Prevalence of Parenthood, supra note 20, at 123.
35. Glennon, supra note 20, at 273.
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final blow to parents already struggling under the accumulating impact of
stressful and disempowered lives with few choices and fewer opportunities.36
There are at least six to nine million children in the United States with
serious emotional disturbances.37 These children are the focus of poorly
coordinated interventions by multiple human service systems—social
services, mental health services, early intervention educational services, and
foster care services—as well as the juvenile correctional system, including
juvenile justice and court diversion, among other services.38
Both personal memoirs and research literature show that when one
member of a family has a serious psychiatric disability—whether the parent
or child—it affects the entire family. Disability theorists emphasize that
disability is less a trait or characteristic manifested by one person than the
product of interaction among individuals, or between an individual and
society.39 The more that individuals interact, the more that the nature and
impact of the disability are mediated by that interaction; thus, this dynamic
and interactive theory of disability may be most true in the context of a
family.40 Even when only one member of a family has a psychiatric
disability, its consequences may have enormous and crucial impact on other
members of the family. Other family members themselves may need
assistance, both to accommodate the family member with a disability and to
help them through the frustration, exhaustion, or confusion that often
accompanies having a family member with a mental disability.

36. In re Juvenile 2006-833, 937 A.2d 297, 300-02 (N.H. 2007) (holding that a
mother’s parental rights could be terminated when she failed to take psychotropic medications
she could not afford, and that the state’s social service agency had no obligation to provide
her with the medications or help her pay for them); In re J.R., CP99010717A, 2003 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 3665, at *5-*6,* 9, *11,* 47 (Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2003) (finding that a mother’s
parental rights could be terminated where she had a psychiatric disability, a co-occurring
substance abuse problem, and difficulty finding and maintaining housing).
37. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL 1999, at 179 (1999), available at http://download.ncadi.samhsa.gov/ken/pdf/
surgeongeneralreport/C3.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
38. Weithorn, supra note 11, at 1314-15.
39. MICHAEL OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 5, 22 (1996).
40. It is regularly reported that people with disabilities, even seriously impairing
disabilities, are successful if they are treated by their parents as “normal” children. See, e.g.,
ALICE DOMURAT DREGER, ONE OF US: CONJOINED TWINS AND THE FUTURE OF NORMAL (2004);
JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
(1994). Children adapt to having a disabled parent quite naturally if the disability is
presented as an ordinary part of the individual’s life. See JOHN HOCKENBERRY, MOVING
VIOLATIONS: WAR ZONES, WHEELCHAIRS, AND DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE (1995). But see,
e.g., ALLEN SHAWN, WISH I COULD BE THERE: NOTES FROM A PHOBIC LIFE 93–115 (2007)
(attributing life-long and severely impairing phobias to his parents’ deeply negative attitudes
toward his developmentally disabled sister, who was sent away at an early age).
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The discussion above assumes that only one member of the family has a
disability, but, like the American household headed by a working father and
stay-at-home mother, the family with one seriously emotionally disabled
family member may be more of a cultural narrative than a reality.41
Increasingly, psychiatric disability is recognized as both interfamilial and
intergenerational.42 Statistics reflect that roughly forty percent of children
with serious emotional disturbance in the mental health system have had a
parent who was psychiatrically hospitalized at least once.43 Approximately
fifty-five percent of children with serious emotional disturbance in the mental
health system have a family history of serious psychiatric disability.44
Between one third and one half of children of mothers with serious mental
illness will themselves have a Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders diagnosable disorder.45 In one survey of mothers with mental
illness, mothers reported that one-third of their adult children had not
completed high school, and about one-third experienced psychological
problems.46 “[I]t [also] might be inferred that the adult children in this study
had relationship problems, in that, at an average age of 22, only about one
in nine were in a committed relationship, although 38 percent were
parents.”47 In fact, children whose parents have serious mental health
problems are generally accepted by federal and state programs as being “at
risk.”48
41. Both research and case law reflect the prevalence of families where both parents and
children have disabilities, or where multiple siblings have disabilities. See J.B. v. Valdez, 186
F.3d 1280, 1283-85 (10th Cir. 1999). Although this article concentrates on psychiatric
disability, the number of poor families where parents and children have both physical and
psychiatric disabilities is strikingly high. See Nat’l Council on Disability, TANF and Disability:
Importance of Supports for Families with Disabilities in Welfare Reform 5-6 (2003), available
at www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/pdf/familysupports.pdf (last visited Feb. 16,
2009) [hereinafter Nat’l Council in Disability, TANF].
42. Nat’l Council in Disability, TANF, supra note 41.
43. CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE
COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES
PROGRAM: EVALUATION FINDINGS, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2002-2003, at 15 fig.4
(2003).
44. Id.
45. Carol Mowbray et al., Parenting of Mothers with a Serious Mental Illness: Differential
Effects of Diagnosis, Clinical History, and Other Mental Health Variables, 26 SOC. WORK RES.
225, 225 (2002) (internal cites omitted); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed., 2000).
46. Carol T. Mowbray et al., Psychosocial Outcomes for Adult Children of Parents with
Severe Mental Illnesses: Demographic and Clinical History Predictors, 21 HEALTH & SOC.
WORK 99, 105 (2006) [hereinafter Mowbray et al., Psychosocial Outcomes].
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 69-4.3(g) (2005) (listing New
York’s Early Intervention Program risk factors, which include “diagnosed serious and persistent
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The fact that mental health problems tend to be intergenerational is well
established in the literature.49 A survey of nearly 6,000 respondents from
across the United States that evaluated respondents’ mental health in a
structured diagnostic interview, then collected information on the mental
health status of respondents’ natural parents, found significant familial
aggregation for all conditions surveyed: major depression, generalized
anxiety disorder, antisocial personality disorder, alcohol abuse/dependence,
and drug abuse/dependence.50 This finding is consistent with a broad array
of studies that have demonstrated convincingly that parents with depression
and anxiety are more likely than the general population to have children
with mental health problems.51 Parental mental health problems have been
associated with an increased risk of both internalizing (e.g. depression) and
externalizing (e.g. Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder) emotional
difficulties in offspring.52 Although different study designs and populations
produce different probabilities, studies have generally shown that children

mental illness”); Maternal and Child Health Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
Abstracts Details: State Grants for Perinatal Depression–Fiscal Year 2006, The Massachusetts
Maternal and Infant Mental Health Project, at https://perfdata.hrsa.gov/mchb/DGISReports/
Abstract/AbstractDetails.aspx?Source=TVIS&GrantNo=P12MC07724&FY=2006 (last visited
Feb. 16, 2009). Details about Minnesota’s programs to assist at risk children whose mothers
have psychiatric difficulties can be found online at Minnesota Dep’t of Health, Minnesota Title
V MCH Needs Assessment Facy Sheets, Promotion of Maternal & Infant Mental Health
Summer 2004, at www.health.state.mn.us/divs/cfh//na/factsheets/pwmi/maternalmenth
lth.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2009); see also Mowbray et al., Psychosocial Outcomes, supra
note 46, at 225.
49. Kenneth S. Kendler et al., The Familial Aggregation of Common Psychiatric and
Substance Use Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey: A Family History Study, 170 BRIT.
J. PSYCHIATRY 541 passim (1997); Roselind Lieb et al., Parental Major Depression and the Risk
of Depression and Other Mental Disorders in Offspring, 59 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 365,
365 (2002); William R. Beardslee et al., Psychiatric Disorder in Adolescent Offspring of
Parents with Affective Disorder in a Non-Referred Sample, 15 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 313, 320
(1988) [hereinafter Beardslee et al., Psychiatric Disorder in Adolescent Offspring]; Catherine
A. Lesesne et al., Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder in School-Aged Children: Association
with Maternal Mental Health and Use of Health Care Resources, 111 PEDIATRICS (Supplement)
1232, 1234 (2003); Shelli Avenevoli & Kathleen Ries Merikangas, Implications of High-Risk
Family Studies for Prevention of Depression, 31 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. (Supplement 1) S126
passim (2006).
50. Kendler et al., supra note 49, at 541-43, 545.
51. Lieb et al., supra note 49, at 365 (stating that “[s]tudies…have consistently shown that
offspring of depressed parents have a substantially increased risk for experiencing not only
depressive disorders, but also other psychopathology, such as anxiety or substance-use
disorders.”); Beardslee et al., Psychiatric Disorder in Adolescent Offspring, supra note 49, at
320.
52. See, e.g., Lesesne et al., supra note 49, at 1233-34 (noting that maternal depression
and anxiety and/or emotional problems are associated with a more than four-fold increased
incidence of ADHD in their offspring); Lieb et al., supra note 49, at 365.
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with a parent suffering from major depression has an odds ratio of
somewhere between 2.21 to 1 and 3.6 to 1 of suffering from some form of
emotional disorder themselves, compared to controls with healthy parents.53
One study of children enrolled in an HMO found that thirty percent of the
children whose parents suffered from major affective disorder suffered from
depression themselves, compared to just two percent of the children whose
parents did not suffer from major affective disorder.54 Other studies put this
figure even higher.55 Furthermore, research has revealed that parental
depression not only increases the odds that children will have depression,
but is also “associated with an earlier onset and a more malignant course
(severity, impairment, recurrence) of depressive disorders in offspring.”56
In fact, studies have shown that psychiatric disabilities are often a multigenerational phenomenon that extends beyond the individual family. In one
three-generational study, researchers found that nearly half of children with
both a parent and a grandparent with major depressive disorder suffered
from some form of psychopathology, and that those grandchildren with both
a parent and grandparent who suffered from major depression were the
most impaired.57 Another study, which followed an original group of
participants, their children, and eventually their grandchildren for nearly
twenty years, revealed that nearly sixty percent of the grandchildren who had
both a parent and a grandparent with major depression suffered from
psychopathology, and when it was measured, the mean age of the
grandchildren was just twelve years old.58
The fact that the impact of psychiatric disability is multi-generational,
however, should not lead to a “three generations of melancholics is
enough” approach.59 Not only research, but personal memoirs and
accounts, reflect the truth that the best and most enduring accommodation

53. Kendler et al., supra note 49, at 545 (collecting studies); Lieb et al., supra note 49, at
369 tbl.2.
54. Beardslee et al., Psychiatric Disorder in Adolescent Offspring, supra note 49, at 320.
55. Avenevoli & Merikangas, supra note 49, at S127 (reviewing the literature and citing a
study showing that the cumulative risk of major depression in children with depressed parents
was nearly 70%).
56. Lieb et al. supra note 49, at 365.
57. Virginia Warner et al., Grandparents, Parents, and Grandchildren at High Risk for
Depression: A Three-Generation Study, 38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 289,
293 (1999).
58. Myrna M. Weissman et al., Families at High and Low Risk for Depression: A 3Generation Study, 62 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 29, 29-30, 34 (2005).
59. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously said, in upholding the sterilization of an
allegedly mentally retarded woman, that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough.” Buck
v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

146

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 2:135

for people with even the most serious disabilities is the love and tenacity of
their family, however imperfectly expressed.60
When a family member has a psychiatric disability, the family may well
need support and services of varying intensity over time. It is not always or
even generally the case that dissolving or dismembering the family will
improve the situation of all or any of the family members. Often the most
powerful incentive a parent, especially a mother, can have to seek treatment
or stay in recovery is to keep her child and be a good parent for that child.61
At the same time, involuntary separation from parents, even imperfect
parents, can be one of the most traumatic events of a child’s life.62 Yet the
structure and framework of state health, mental health, and protective
service agencies which fail to identify and recognize the centrality of family
members’ attachment to each other, as well as their efforts and
accommodations, often do result in family dissolution. Dissolution itself can
lead to institutionalization for one or more members of the family in years
and sometimes generations to come.
While there is significant evidence demonstrating the intergenerational
impact of a psychiatric disability, the mechanism is less clear. One reason
may be that “[b]ecause of the stigma attached to mental illness, parents may
not ever share the fact that they have a mental illness with their children.
This means that even years later, adult children may not have an
explanation for parental behavior.”63 One of the most successful and
simplest programs for families in which one member has a psychiatric
disability is an educational program for the entire family explaining about
mental illness and what family members can expect, which is discussed in
greater detail infra.64
Another explanation is that families in which one member has a severe
mental illness are also often characterized by stressful environments,
60. See generally ANDREW BRIDGE, HOPE’S BOY (2008); KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, AN
UNQUIET MIND (1995); TRACY THOMPSON, THE BEAST: A JOURNEY THROUGH DEPRESSION (1995);
JEANNE SAFER, THE NORMAL ONE: LIFE WITH A DIFFICULT OR DAMAGED SIBLING (2002); see also
supra note 40 and accompanying text.
61. See Carol T. Mowbray et al., Motherhood for Women with Serious Mental Illness:
Pregnancy, Childbirth, and the Postpartum Period, 65 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 21, 21 (1995);
APFEL & HANDEL, supra note 14, at 4-5, 160-61.
62. See BRIDGE, supra note 60.
63. Jared Wadley, Adult Children of Mothers with Mental Illness Show Problems, UNIV. OF
MICH. NEWS SERVICE, June 1, 2006, at www.ns.umich.edu/htdocs/releases/story.php?id=276
(last visited Feb. 16, 2009) (quoting “Daphna Oyserman, a professor of social work and
psychology, and a research professor in the Institute for Social Research . . . .”).
64. William R. Beardslee et al., A Family-Based Approach to the Prevention of Depressive
Symptoms in Children at Risk: Evidence of Parental and Child Change, 112 PEDIATRICS e119,
e122, e127 (2003), at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/112/2/e119 (last
visited Feb. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Beardslee et al., A Family Based Approach].
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including uncertain housing, health care, and income for groceries, which
also lead to marital discord and depression.65 Some research indicates that
stressful environments increase the likelihood that the children of depressed
parents will develop depression.66 Because of this, programs like Thresholds
in Chicago which assist the family to obtain stable housing and employment
often show beneficial results in terms of family stability.67
Genetics explains only a small piece of the familial aggregation
phenomenon.68 No specific “depression gene” has been identified.69
Family-environmental factors are thought to be a major driver of family
clustering of mental health problems, although findings are not always
conclusive.70 Specifically, studies have focused on the fact that parental
mental illness can lead to poor parenting, which in turn is associated with
increased mental health problems in children.71 For example, studies have
shown that maternal depression can lead mothers to “exhibit inadequate
parenting skills (e.g., less interaction, ineffective control strategies) and
model dysregulated affect (e.g., restricted affect, more hostility, irritability,
and sadness)”, all of which are associated with the development of mental
health and/or behavioral problems in offspring.72 Similar mental health
and/or behavioral problems in offspring emerge in family environments
characterized by high levels of “family and marital discord, divorce,
inattention, rejection, abuse and stress”.73
Given that children with a family history of mental health problems are
at a high risk of depression or other psychiatric disorders, and the apparent
importance of family-environmental factors, many researchers and clinicians
have theorized that interventions targeting the family environment are the

65. See Nat’l Council on Disability, TANF, supra note 41, at 22 (a heartbreaking review
by the National Council on Disability of families where both parents and children had
disabilities and the parents were forced to work under TANF).
66. See Avenevoli & Merikangas, supra note 49, at S128; Mark T. Greenberg et al., The
Prevention of Mental Disorders in School-Aged Children: Current State of the Field, 4
PREVENTION & TREATMENT, Mar. 30, 2001, at 27-28.
67. Thresholds Psychiatric Rehabilitation Ctrs., The Thresholds Mothers’ Project:
Overview, at www.thresholds.org/mothers.asp (last visited Feb. 29, 2009).
68. Avenevoli & Merikangas, supra note 49, at S127, S128.
69. Id. at S128.
70. See id. at S128, S132 (explaining that “impaired family environments and social
relationships of individuals with depression contribute to the risk for depression among family
members”); see Kendler et al., supra note 49, at 546 (finding that “only a modest proportion
of overall familial aggregation of all disorders, except for [antisocial personality disorder][,]”
could be explained by family environmental factors).
71. Avenevoli & Merikangas, supra note 49, at S128.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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most useful in mitigating risks to children.74 Research has shown that familybased interventions can be effective in preventing the onset of
psychopathology in children of parents with mental illness.75
Beardslee et al. designed and tested a family-based intervention that
aimed to increase resilience in adolescents who were at high risk for
psychiatric disorders due specifically to having parents with mental
illnesses.76 The intervention was mostly educational, and focused on giving
both affected parents and their children more information about their
disease.77 The information included details about the disease itself, how
and why it should be discussed with their children, how parental mood
disorders affect children and what warning signs to look for, how to help
their children develop relationships and behaviors associated with increased
resiliency, and how to reduce familial-environmental conditions associated
with increased psychopathology in children of parents with mood
disorders.78 The information was delivered in one of two ways. Part of the
study group received the information in two separate lectures, with no
children present.79 The other part of the study group participated in six to
eleven one-on-one meetings with a care provider, with some of these
meetings involving the children and some only involving the child, and with
follow-up phone calls and/or meetings at six to nine month intervals.80
Follow-up interviews with parents and children showed that the children had
a better understanding of their parents’ disease, and also showed fewer
internalizing symptoms, which are considered a precursor to more serious
affective disorders.81 These positive effects were still present when measured
four and a half years after the relatively brief intervention.82
In a review of interventions designed to prevent childhood mental illness
for children at risk for a variety of reasons not limited to family history of
psychiatric disorders, Greenberg et al. found thirty-four interventions that
had successfully reduced symptoms or direct precursors of childhood mental

74. Id. at S132 (concluding that “findings support family-based programs . . . .
Additionally, the large environmental component of depression suggests that alterations in the
environments of those at risk for depression (by virtue of a family history) can lower risk for
depression.”).
75. See William R. Beardslee et al., Long-Term Effects from a Randomized Trial of Two
Public Health Preventive Interventions for Parental Depression, 21 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 703, 704,
710 (2007) [hereinafter Beardslee et al., Long Term Effects] .
76. Beardslee et al., A Family Based Approach, supra note 64, at e120.
77. Id. at e122.
78. Id. at e122.
79. Id. at e123.
80. Id. at e122.
81. Beardslee et al., A Family Based Approach, supra note 64, at e127-28.
82. Bearslee et al., Long Term Effects, supra note 75.
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illness, had been rigorously evaluated and published in a peer-reviewed
journal, and had targeted children between the ages of five and eighteen.83
The reviewers concluded that interventions targeting children alone were less
effective in reducing psychiatric symptomology than programs that targeted
children, parents and schools together.84 Greenberg et al. also noted that
more interventions had been designed that focused on preventing
externalizing (i.e. aggression) as opposed to internalizing (i.e. depression)
behavior.85
Of course, the impact of the disability goes beyond the family. The
family is both affected by the person’s disability and by the social response
to the disability. It can mediate and interpret the social response to the
disabled family member by reinforcing it, by discounting it, and by giving the
disabled family member acceptance, hope, and support, or by some
complex mixture of these elements which may vary over time and individual
family members. The family’s actions and reactions to disability—support,
helplessness, rejection, and abuse, for example—in turn ameliorate or
exacerbate the effects of the disability for the individual, and affect how the
individual approaches the world—another reason that family supports and
services are a key first step to community integration.86 A family’s positive
and supportive attitudes and behaviors toward its disabled family member
signals to neighbors, school officials, and the community how they should
react to the individual with a disability. By the same token, family
disparagement, frustration, and negativity may also carry over into the
attitudes of providers and community members.
III. THE ADA AND KEEPING FAMILIES TOGETHER
A.

The Integration Mandate

When Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act was passed in 1973, it
contained a single line prohibiting discrimination on the basis of handicap
in programs receiving federal funding.87 Because programs were federally
funded by different agencies across the Executive Branch, from the
Department of Transportation to the Department of Housing and Urban
Development,88 each federal agency had to develop its own regulations to

83. Beardslee et al., supra note 66, at 7-8.
84. Id. at 33.
85. Id. at 34.
86. Susan Stefan, “Discredited” and “Discreditable”: The Search for Political Identity by
People with Psychiatric Diagnoses, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341, 1355 (2003).
87. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973).
88. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.190 (1991) for description of agencies charged with enforcing
the regulations.
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implement Section 504 in the particular programs it funded.89 Since it was
obvious that many definitions and other aspects of the regulations would be
identical across the agencies, a “lead agency” was designated to issue socalled “coordination regulations” which applied to all agencies and which
had special authority.90 The then-Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) was designated the “lead agency.”91 HEW delayed issuing
these coordination regulations, but finally, after significant pressure
(including a federal lawsuit,92 disability activists taking over the San
Francisco office of HEW, and picketing the home of Secretary Califano93), it
reluctantly issued regulations implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.94
One of these “coordination” regulations which applied across the board
to all recipients of federal funds, regardless of their program, was a
provision that was the forerunner of a regulation that came to be known as
the “integration mandate.”95 In the coordination regulations, HHS defined
discrimination as a failure to provide equally effective aids, benefits, and
services to handicapped individuals as nonhandicapped person.96 The
regulation added that
[f]or purposes of this part, aids, benefits, and services, to be equally
effective, are not required to produce the identical result or level of
achievement for handicapped and nonhandicapped persons, but must
afford handicapped persons equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to
gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement, in the
most integrated setting appropriate to the person’s needs.97

Later, the “lead agency” function was shifted to the Department of
Justice, which adapted and updated HEW’s regulations.98 The Department
of Justice regulations defined discrimination as failure to provide services in

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See id.
See id.
SHAPIRO, supra note 40, at 65-66.
Cherry v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp. 922, 923 (D.D.C. 1976).
RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL
DISABILITY POLICY 112, 115 (2nd ed. 2001); SHAPIRO, supra note 40, at 66. See both SCOTCH
and SHAPIRO for accounts of the history behind the battle to obtain regulations for Section
504.
94. These regulations are titled “Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs
or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance” and are found at 45 C.F.R. § 84 (2008).
95. Nat’l Disability Rights Network, Issue Areas-Community Integration: ADA Title II, at
www.napas.org/issues/commint/title2.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2009); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d)
(2008); 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d) (2008).
96. 28 C.F.R. § 41.51 (2008).
97. 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(2) (2007) (emphasis added).
98. SCOTCH, supra note 93, at 129-30.
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the most integrated setting appropriate to the individual’s needs.99 The
commentary to the Section 504 regulations also added a definition of an
integrated setting for the first time. It provided that an integrated setting is
“a setting that enables disabled individuals to interact with non-disabled
persons to the fullest extent possible”.100
The first case to recognize that an institutional setting might constitute
segregation in violation of antidiscrimination law was decided years before
the passage of the ADA, and more than a decade before the Supreme
Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C..101 Homeward Bound v. Hissom,102
more than any case in the intervening twenty-plus years, serves as a model
of understanding of the relationship between a person with mental
disabilities remaining with his or her family and that person’s successful
integration in the community. Homeward Bound is a tutorial on the
necessary connection between family stabilization and community
integration. The court in Homeward Bound created principles and remedies
that remain as alive and true today as they were when it was written over
twenty years ago.
B.

Cases Ahead of Their Time: Homeward Bound v. Hissom and Joyner v.
Dumpson
1. Homeward Bound v. Hissom

In 1987, three years before the passage of the ADA and twelve years
before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Olmstead v. L.C., a Republicanappointed judge in Oklahoma considered a challenge by institutionalized
individuals with mental disabilities and their families to the conditions of the
institution in which these disabled people were forced to live, and the State’s
failure to provide services in the community.103 The judge ruled for the
plaintiffs, holding that “Section 504 recognizes the parallels between
discrimination suffered by our handicapped citizens and other minority
groups. This discrimination is manifested through their segregation from the
rest of society. . . . Section 504 prohibits unnecessarily segregated services
for retarded persons.”104

99. 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d) (2008).
100. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 App. A (2008).
101. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
102. See Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Hissom Mem’l Ctr., No.85-C-437-E, 1987 WL 27104
(N.D. Okla. July 24, 1987); Timothy M. Cook, Howard Bound Court Strikes Blow to StateSupported Segregated Services for Disabled Persons, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP.
358, 358 (1987).
103. Homeward Bound, 1987 WL 27104 at *8-*14.
104. Id. at *20.
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The court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to services that were
effective and meaningful and delivered in non-segregated settings. He
further held that the institution must be closed, and ordered the State of
Oklahoma to develop a new community service system to remedy the effects
of its original discriminatory system.105 In developing its remedy, the court
explained the centrality of the family to the goal of community integration,
and tailored the remedial plans accordingly.106 The remedy in Homeward
Bound focused heavily on family integration and family support.107
At the beginning of the Court Plan, Judge Ellison wrote the following
words, worth reproducing at length:
As Americans and citizens of Oklahoma, we believe in rugged
individualism, the sanctity of the family and in taking care of our own. We
grow from the experience of living together in the community. We admire
those who work and we work hard so that our children can have the best life
and education possible. We have sacrificed to maintain our freedom and a
life which is nonrestrictive. These values are our heritage which we preserve
so that it can be passed down to our children—all of our children.
The qualify of life made available in the United States as a result of this
value base is the best in the world for those who are allowed to share in it.
The “American Dream” rests at the foundation of the values we defend.
From the evidence presented it is apparent that these values have been
denied to that portion of the citizens of Oklahoma who carry the label of
“mental retardation”. Therefore, this Order shall include “Guiding
Principles” which are intended to direct the remedy developed by the parties
as they create community alternatives for persons with mental retardation in
Oklahoma. These guiding principles are as follows:
* All persons are capable of growth and development.
* All persons deserve to be treated with dignity.
* All persons have value.
* All persons must be involved in and carry the primary responsibility for
the decisions which affect their lives.
* All persons should live and work in the most natural settings.
* All children should live with families.
* All children have the right to a free and appropriate education.

105. Id. at *21, *30-*31.
106. Id. at *23.
107. Id at *27.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2008]

ACCOMMODATING FAMILIES

153

* All persons should live in and be a part of the community.
* All citizens have the right to fully exercise their rights as guaranteed by
the Constitution of the United States.108

The language and the remedy in Homeward Bound emphasized that
family services, accommodating families, and community integration for
individuals with mental disabilities were unitary and inseparable parts of the
remedy.109 The court observed that
[h]istorically the public policy of Oklahoma has been that persons with
mental retardation will only receive support in living environments if the
individual leaves home and moves to a state operated institution. The State
has provided little or no resource to assist a person to stay at home, but has
consistently provided immense financial resource to house people away
from their own homes. The result has been that families have become
frustrated with their inability to respond to the family member’s needs. . . .
Families have experienced severe pain at having to separate their child from
home and family.110

The court ordered that “[a] gatekeeping mechanism must be
implemented to insure that persons will not be removed from their natural
home except in extreme circumstances[,]” and that “[a]ll necessary supports
and services must be provided to the home so that it can be the living
environment most likely to provide for individual growth and
development.”111 The court further ruled that “[i]n home and family support
services shall not cost the family any more than would be the cost of raising
a child without mental retardation[,]” that “[r]espite, including emergency,
occasional and regular respite, as well as in home workers shall be
available, as needed, to maintain a balanced, nurturing and supportive
home environment . . . “ Further, the court required that “[p]arent/family
training will be provided on any issue pertinent to positively maintaining the
child at home”.112 But the court also astutely recognized that family support
services must be voluntary and tailored to each individual family’s needs:
“[i]ntrusion into normal home life shall be minimized and no more support
or service shall be provided than is required.”113 In addition, the court
ordered the provision of transportation to allow involvement in community
life and case management to insure access to and coordination of supports
and services, including participation in education services.114 Finally, the
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Homeward Bound, 1987 WL 27104 at *22-*23.
Id. at *23.
Id. at *27.
Id.
Homeward Bound, 1987 WL 27104 at *27.
Id.
Id. at *28.
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court directed the State of Oklahoma to ensure that “licensure, policies and
procedures of the programs, supports and services which currently exist or
those which will be developed” did not have conflicts with or hamper the
remedy, and that abundant protective mechanisms be built into the system,
including self advocacy training, incident reports and reviews, and
independent case management.115
The Homeward Bound remedy is a detailed blueprint for a communitybased system which emphasizes family integrity. Thus, disability advocates’
current failure to ensure that Olmstead integration claims include family
integrity and preservation is hard to understand. If the Homeward Bound
framework were adopted by social service agencies today as part of the
structure of services provided to families of people with mental and
psychiatric disabilities, it is likely that those families would be far more likely
stay intact and integrated in the community.
2. Joyner v. Dumpson
Even before Homeward Bound, disability advocates challenged New
York State’s requirement that parents had to give up custody of their
children to the Department of Social Services in order for the children to
receive residential services for serious emotional needs.116 The parents
challenged this requirement, claiming that it violated the Constitution and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.117 In language that foreshadowed the
decision in Olmstead v. L.C. more than fifteen years in the future, plaintiffs
argued that this requirement discriminated against them because
among all those eligible to receive any of the various forms of partially
federally funded state assistance, only plaintiffs [were] required to submit to
state custody as a prerequisite of receipt of needed benefits. Plaintiffs also
[asserted] that within the class of handicapped persons, plaintiffs
comprise[d] a disadvantaged sub-class that alone [was] subject to the
custody transfer requirement prior to the receipt of special services. Plaintiffs
argue[d] that the pre-condition imposed only on them as a result of their
need for treatment in residential facilities [limited] their access to needed
benefits and [discouraged] their use of needed benefits in direct violation of
§ 504 and 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(a) (1980).118

The District Court, noting that defendant could not proffer any
reasonable explanation for why parents would have to give up custody of
their children to receive services, and underscoring that this rule applied
only to children with mental disabilities, granted summary judgment both on
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Joyner v. Dumpson, 533 F. Supp. 233, 234-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Id.
Id. at 238.
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the Section 504 claims and on the accompanying constitutional claims.119
The Second Circuit reversed on the grounds that Section 504 did not apply
to disparate impact claims,120 a premise with which the Supreme Court
disagreed only a few years later in Alexander v. Choate.121 The Second
Circuit did find, however, that plaintiffs had stated a viable constitutional
claim and remanded the case to the District Court.122
Years after Joyner, parents still have to surrender custody of their
children across the country to obtain the mental health services that their
children need. This is clearly discriminatory under Olmstead, and very likely
a constitutional violation as well, and will be discussed more fully in
Section V.
C. The Americans with Disabilities Act
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act proved disappointing to advocates
and people with disabilities, both in its scope and the interpretations of the
courts.123 Prior to passing the ADA, Congress gathered an unprecedented
amount of testimony regarding discrimination against people with
disabilities, including at least some testimony by people with physical
disabilities who were not permitted to adopt children.124
As a result of this testimony Congress had a much broader view of the
nature and impact of disability discrimination in America, and by the time
the ADA was passed, the language of integration was clearly at the heart of
the ADA’s mandate.125 In reports pertaining to the ADA, both houses of
Congress concluded that
there is a compelling need to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities and for the integration of persons with disabilities into the
economic and social mainstream of American life. Further, there is a need
119. Id. at 239, 242.
120. Joyner v. Dumpson, 712 F.2d 770, 772 (2d Cir. 1983).
121. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
122. Joyner, 712 F.2d at 772.
123. See Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing the
shortcomings of Section 504).
124. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 5-20 (1989) (testimony regarding the need for
legislation prohibiting disability discrimination); see H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 43-47
(1990) (testimony regarding the effects of disability discrimination on society). This
discrimination has by no means ended. See generally Doe v. Nebraska, 345 F.3d 593 (8th
Cir. 2003) (child removed from prospective adoptive parents’ home when it was discovered
that mother was HIV-positive); Doe v. Division of Youth and Family Servs., 148 F. Supp. 2d
462 (D.N.J. 2001) (infant removed from mother at the hospital when hospital reported to
Division of Youth and Family Services that mother had HIV and was refusing to take AZT).
125. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 20 (1989); see H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 50
(1990).
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to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.126

In furtherance of the objective of eliminating discrimination against the
disabled, Congress stated that “the Nation’s proper goals regarding
individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such
individuals[.]”127
Title II of the ADA applies to state and local governments, mental health
agencies, social service agencies, and the state courts and incorporates the
anti-discrimination principles of Section 504.128 The anti-discrimination
prohibitions of Title II, like those of Section 504, were written in several
lines.129 In the ADA, Congress directed the Attorney General to promulgate
regulations necessary to implement Title II,130 and mandated that those
regulations “be consistent with this chapter and with the coordination
regulations under part 41 of title 28, Code of Federal Regulations” under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.131 Accordingly, the
regulations that the Department of Justice promulgated under Title II are
patterned after the Section 504 coordination regulations, including the
integration mandate.132
The position of the Department of Justice is that “integration is
fundamental to the purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act.”133 The
Department has adopted regulations, some similar or identical to the
coordination regulations of Section 504.134 One such regulation, the
integration mandate, is almost identical to the Section 504 integration
regulation that has been in effect since 1981, which provides that “[a]
public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities in the most

126. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 20 (1989); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 50 (1990)
(emphasis added).
127. Helen L., 46 F.3d at 332 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2000) (emphasis
added)).
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134 (2000).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (2000).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b) (2000).
132. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (2007) (prohibiting disability discrimination by public entities
and mandating that public entities administer services, programs, and activities in the most
integrated setting appropriate); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
133. Helen L., 46 F.3d at 332-33 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130, App. A (2007)).
134. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(a) (2007) (“No qualified individual with a disability shall, on the
basis of disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any public
entity.”).
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integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with
disabilities.”135
In the seven years between the time that the ADA’s integration mandate
took effect and the Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in Olmstead v. L.C., a
number of cases were brought seeking to enforce integration mandate
provisions and to ensure that services were provided to disabled individuals
in the community.136 In many of these cases, the facts of the case reveal
that the plaintiffs were members of families.137 In some cases the court
explicitly noted the desires of the plaintiffs and family members to be
together;138 in others, the fact is provided as an aside, leaving the reader to
imagine the sadness of the back story.139 In Helen L. v. Didario, for
example, we learn that the sole remaining plaintiff, Idell S., had been

135. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2007); 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d) (1981); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d)
(2007); 28 C.F.R. § 41.5(a) (2007); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
136. See Helen L., 46 F.3d at 331 (suit alleging that the Department of Public Welfare
violated the ADA by mandating that she receive required care services in the segregated
setting of a nursing home rather than through an attendant care program in her own home);
see also Cercpac v. Health and Hospitals Corp., 147 F.3d 165, 166,168 (2d Cir. 1998) (suit
alleging that a municipal agency failed to deliver medical care in the most integrated setting
available); Onishea v. Hopper, 126 F.3d 1323, 1326 (11th Cir. 1997) (suit brought by HIVpositive Alabama inmates alleging that state prisons violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 by excluding HIV positive prisoners from programs offered); Heather S. v. Wisconsin,
125 F.3d 1045, 1047, 1051 (7th Cir. 1997) (suit brought by parents alleging that the state
discriminated on the basis of their child’s disability by failing to adequately provide
educational opportunities to her); Kathleen S. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 10 F. Supp. 2d 476,
478 (E.D.Pa. 1998) (suit alleged discrimination for “Commonwealth’s failure to adequately
plan and develop community placements” for those whom treatment was deemed
appropriate); Wyatt ex rel. Rawlins v. Rogers, 985 F. Supp. 1356, 1360, 1432 (M.D.Ala.
1997) (suit alleging that the conditions in the Alabama Mental Health and Mental Retardation
System facilities violated the residents’ rights); Shultz ex rel. Shultz v. Hemet Youth Pony
League, Inc. 943 F. Supp. 1222, 1226 (C.D.Cal. 1996) (finding that defendants’ failure to
make necessary and reasonable attempts to ascertain what modifications, if any, were
plausible in order to accommodate plaintiff’s disability was “discriminatory inaction against
[p]laintiff on the basis of [p]laintiff’s disability”).
137. See Heather S., 125 F.3d at 1047 (parent brought action on behalf of child); Wyatt
ex. rel. Rawlins, 985 F. Supp. at 1365 (stating that “[e]arlier in the year, the committee had
reported to plaintiffs’ counsel and the court its concern that the majority of the children at the
center were not in need of the type of restrictive and isolated environment the facility provides,
and that these children could be more appropriately served in a less restrictive program closer
to their homes and families.”); Cercpac, 147 F.3d at 166 (stating that the case was brought
by “Lincoln CERCPAC, an association of individuals and families concerned with health care
services for children with developmental disabilities, and four parents or guardians of minor
children . . . .”); Shultz, 943 F. Supp. at 1222 (father brought claim on behalf of son to
mandate integration).
138. See, e.g., Martin v. Voinovich, 840 F. Supp. 1175, 1181 (S.D.Ohio 1993).
139. See, e.g., Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995).
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physically disabled since 1973 from meningitis.140 She had a child around
the time that she became disabled, and later had another child.141 When
her two children were eight and sixteen, she was forced to enter a nursing
home because of basic needs that could easily have been accommodated
with attendant care services.142 She was placed on a waiting list to receive
these services because Pennsylvania insufficiently funded home-based
services.143 Idell S. lost six crucial years with her children while she was
unnecessarily confined in a nursing home.144 The damage and injury done
by Pennsylvania’s policies favoring nursing home placement over community
services was not solely to Idell S., but to her children, who lost their mother
for important years of their childhood and adolescence.
D. Olmstead v. L.C.
In Olmstead v. L.C., the Supreme Court heard the case of two women
with mental retardation and psychiatric disabilities who were ready for
discharge from an institution but continued to be confined because there
were no appropriate community placements available for them.145 In
Olmstead, the Supreme Court applied the ADA’s integration mandate and
held that unjustified isolation was segregation that violated the ADA,
regardless of whether a comparison class existed.146 In explaining why
segregation of disabled people constituted discrimination, Justice Ginsberg
noted that “confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life
activities of individuals, including family relations,”147 and reinforced
stigmatizing ideas that people with disabilities were incapable or unworthy of
participating in community life.148 In a later case, the Supreme Court
emphasized that barriers to marriage and having a family on the basis of
disability were examples of the kind of discrimination that Title II was
designed to address.149
The Court in Olmstead held that the ADA did not require plaintiffs to
show that a comparison class existed in order to prevail on claims under the
integration mandate, but also noted that a comparison class did exist: nonmentally disabled people who were not required to forego their liberty to

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 328.
Id.
Id. at 328-29.
Id. at 329.
Helen L v. DiDario, 46 F.3d at 329.
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 593-94 (1999).
Id. at 596-97.
Id. at 601.
Id. at 600.
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 524 & n.8 (2004).
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receive needed health services.150 In his concurring opinion, Justice
Kennedy argued that liberty is not the only due process right that mentally
disabled people forego to receive needed health services, and recognized
that non-disabled people need not forego association with their families to
receive needed health services.151 Family association, no less than the
liberty to live in the community, is destroyed by unnecessary
institutionalization, isolation, and segregation. In many ways, it is an
equally important right because it helps give meaning and substance to life
in the community. In a moving account, Atlanta Legal Services reported on
the success of the two plaintiffs in Olmstead v. L.C., Elaine Wilson and Lois
Curtis, once they were able to live in the community.152 Strikingly, both their
accounts of the joys of life in the community included interaction with family
that had previously been denied to them: Lois Curtis “has (after many years)
reconnected with her mom and sister,” and Elaine Wilson “made regular
weekend trips home to be with her extended family.”153
Two years prior to its decision in Olmstead, the Supreme Court held in
M.L.B. v. S.L.J. that
[c]hoices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are
among [the] associational rights this Court has ranked as of ‘basic
importance in our society,’ rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment
against the State’s unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect. [A
case] involving the State’s authority to sever permanently sever a parentchild bond[] demands the close consideration the Court has long required
when a family association so undeniably important is at stake.154

Although a family does not have the right to state funds or new
programs to keep it together,155 it does have the right, pursuant to the ADA
and Olmstead, to require that services already offered by the State are not
contingent on having to choose between family and association in the
community and receipt of services in an isolated institutional setting. While
the Seventh Circuit held in Bruggeman v. Blagojevich that Medicaid does
not create the right to services nearer to the recipient’s family, the court
remanded the plaintiffs’ ADA and Section 504 claims.156

150. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 596, 611-12.
151. Id. at 611-12.
152. See Atlanta Legal Aid Society, Impact Cases, Olmstead v. LC and EW, at www.atlanta
legalaid.org/impact.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
153. See id.
154. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116-17 (1996 ).
155. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 607-08 (1987).
156. Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 911-12, 913 (7th Cir. 2003).
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Cases about Family Integrity in the Wake of Olmstead v. L.C.

Very few cases have attempted to apply the integration mandate in the
context of family integrity. Recently, a federal district court in Connecticut
granted summary judgment to state agency defendants with respect to a
parent’s Olmstead claim; the case challenged the disparity between
Connecticut’s cap on both home-based services and family preservation
services for seriously emotionally disturbed children and its unlimited
provision of hospitalization for the same child.157 In addition, the plaintiff
challenged the provision of inadequate services, and reduction of even
those services, as making institutionalization inevitable and thus violating the
integration mandate.158
As to the second claim, the court held that the integration mandate did
not support a claim for inadequate services, or create a right to stay out of
institutions.159 It rejected the mother’s Olmstead claim regarding the
disparity between the cap on funding for community-based family
preservation services as opposed to hospitalization by noting that the child’s
hospitalizations came at the request of the mother and/or the orders of a
Probate Court.160 This analysis completely misses the point of the claim: it is
as though the court in Homeward Bound, Helen L., or Olmstead had
rejected the plaintiffs’ claims on the grounds that they had voluntarily placed
their children at the state institution, or stayed in institutional settings, when
the state’s failure to fund community services gave them no choice.
Several systemic challenges to the services received by children with
emotional disabilities touch on family integration, but those claims have not
been adjudicated on the merits. In J.B. v. Valdez, plaintiffs challenged the
defendant’s practice of failing to maintain family integrity by splitting siblings
in foster care, but lost their motion for class certification.161 In Katie A. v.
Bontá, the plaintiffs challenged the failure of Los Angeles County and the
State of California to provide home-based and community-based mental
health services to seriously emotionally disturbed children in the child
welfare system.162 The plaintiffs sought the provision of wraparound homebased services and therapeutic foster care services, which they argued
would permit at least half of the children currently institutionalized in
residential facilities to return home, or at least to therapeutic foster care
homes in the community.163 Although the case included an Olmstead

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

M.K. ex rel. Mrs. K. v. Sergi, 554 F. Supp. 2d 175, 197, 201 (D.Conn. 2008).
Id. at 195-96.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 199.
J.B. v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1284, 1290 (10th Cir. 1999 ).
Katie A. v. Bontá, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1067 (C.D.Cal. 2006).
Id.
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claim, Los Angeles County settled with the plaintiffs, and the District Court
granted a preliminary injunction against California on the Medicaid claims
without reaching the ADA claims.164 The Ninth Circuit reversed on narrow
grounds, accepting many of the district court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law.165 The plaintiffs have renewed their request for a
preliminary injunction, which is pending with the District Court.166
The plaintiffs’ success in cases such as Katie A. and Rosie D. v.
Romney167 in obtaining wraparound and home-based services have been
based on the provisions of the EPSDT portion of the Medicaid statute, which
applies only to children.168 Although the right is the child’s, one of the
remedies—wraparound services—provides services for the family, enabling
it to better accommodate the child. Ironically, despite the Constitution’s
embrace of family association and the ADA integration mandate, Medicaid
EPSDT claims are presently the most successful vehicles to provide services
to keep families together when one member has a disability.
IV. ADA LITIGATION IN TERMINATION PROCEEDINGS: A BLUEPRINT FOR FAILURE
The principal ADA-based argument used to date to try to keep families
together is that disabled parents must be accommodated in reunification
services provided by social service agencies.169 Advocates have argued that
in order for parents with disabilities to have effective access to these
services, the ADA requires social service agencies and other public entities
to modify the assistance and reunification services they provide to
accommodate a parent’s disability.170 These cases have generally been

164. Id. at 1078.
165. Katie A. ex rel Ludin v. Los Angeles County, 481 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2007).
166. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, available at www.bazelon.org/issues/children/incourt/KatieA/Plaintiffs
Brief1-11-08.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
167. Rosie D. ex rel. John D. v. Romney, 474 F. Supp. 2d 238 (D.Mass. 2007).
168. Katie A., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1065; Rosie D. ex rel. John D., 474 F. Supp. 2d 238.
169. This argument only works, however, if the state requires the agency to provide
reunification services, which several states do not. See Chris Watkins, Beyond Status: The
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Parental Rights of People Labeled Developmentally
Disabled or Mentally Retarded, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1415, 1444 (1995); ALA. CODE § 26-18-7(a)
(2007), at www.legislature.state.al.us/CodeofAlabama/1975/coatoc.htm (last visited Feb. 16,
2009); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(d) (2006) at http://delcode.delaware.gov/title13/
c011/index.shtml#TopOfPage (last visited Feb. 19, 2009); GA. CODE. ANN. § 15-11-58
(2008), at www.lexis-nexis.com/hottopics/gacode/default.asp (last visited Feb. 16, 2009);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 587-26 (2006), at www.capitol.hawaii.gov/hrscurrent/Vol12_Ch05010588/HRS0587/HRS_0587-0026.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2009); MO. REV. STAT. § 211.183
(2008), at www.moga.mo.gov/statutes/C200-299/2110000183.HTM (last visited Feb. 16,
2009).
170. Watkins, supra note 169, at 1473.
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brought individually, as opposed to a class action suit, and they have
generally been unsuccessful.171
Although the social service agencies are undeniably covered by Title II of
the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the resistance of state
and federal courts to accommodation-based arguments in termination of
parental rights proceedings is legendary.172 Courts have reasoned, for
example, that termination proceedings are not “‘services, programs or
activities’” covered by the ADA,173 that the ADA cannot be used as a
defense to the termination of parental rights of a disabled parent,174 that the
ADA does not apply to an individual termination proceeding because of the
Younger abstention doctrine, and that even if the family services agency
violates the parent’s ADA rights, it shouldn’t change the ultimate decision
about terminating parental rights.175 Ultimately, the perspective in most of
these cases distills down to the view that the federal ADA rights of the
parents must be subordinated to the rights of the child, a view which
explicitly frames the parent and child as adversaries.176
This resistance seems explicitly rooted in courts’ hostility toward the
psychiatrically disabled parent, which often appears to be a reflection of the
social service agencies’ hostility to the disabled parent. Several courts have
faulted disabled mothers for exhibiting a “know-it-all” attitude and for being
uncooperative or hostile with social workers who wanted to take their
children away.177
This hostility may be inevitable when parental termination proceedings
inherently and structurally set up a framework that predisposes a court to
regard the parental interests in keeping the child as fundamentally in conflict
with the best interests of the child, who has usually already been removed
from the home pursuant to a finding of abuse or neglect. By bringing
parental termination proceedings, a family services agency has made the

171. See M.K. ex rel. Mrs. K. v. Sergi, 554 F. Supp. 2d 233, 236 (D.Conn. 2008); J.T. v.
Dep’t of Human Servs., 947 S.W.2d 761, 762 (Ark. 1997); In re P.B., No. 7-528 / 07-1042,
2007 Iowa App. LEXIS 1009, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007); In re Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d
243, 244 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994); In re C.M., 526 N.W.2d 562, 564 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994).
172. See Glennon, supra note 20, at 289.
173. In re C.M.S., 646 S.E.2d 592, 595 (N.C. App. 2007).
174. In re Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d at 246.
175. J.T. v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 947 S.W.2d at 768.
176. Stone v. Daviess County Div. of Children & Family Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824, 831 (Ind.
App. 1995) (quoted in J.T., 947 S.W.2d at 768).
177. In re P.B., No. 7-528 / 07-1042, 2007 Iowa App. LEXIS 1009, at *5 (2007); In re
M.B. and C.B. v. Del. County Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 570 N.E.2d 78, 80-81 (Ind. Ct. App.
1991).
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determination that the parent is irredeemably abusive or neglectful,178 and
although the State technically has the burden of proof, a court may well be
predisposed to credit an agency’s determination, especially in the case of a
disabled parent.179 A disabled parent asking for accommodations is placed
in the anomalous and paradoxical role of asserting that he or she can
parent adequately, and simultaneously requesting what may well be
perceived as “special” and “additional” services.
Reasonable
accommodations have a troubled and inaccurate history of being equated
in the minds of judges with affirmative action in race cases, and this may
strike courts as a particularly inapposite right to assert when the welfare of a
child is at stake. Implicitly or explicitly, the accommodations to the parent
are somehow seen as coming at the expense of the child.180
In addition, litigating accommodation cases one at a time inevitably
involves a focus on the parent’s difficulties and flaws as a parent. Whatever
aspect of the disability needs to be accommodated will inevitably be
presented this way, rather than looking at the failure of the agency in
planning to serve disabled parents and children when it has every reason to
know that this group will constitute a large proportion, perhaps even a
majority, of the people to whom it is mandated to provide services. The
specific problems of the parent before the judge is compared with the
problems of an abstract alternative called “the foster care system.” Very few
courts, and almost all of them appellate or state supreme courts, are willing
to relegate the child to an imperfect family rather than a foster care system
whose flaws are usually not before the court. In addition, few family service
workers or judges are aware of the voluminous research literature reflecting
the harm suffered by many children placed in foster care.181
In any event, “accommodations” are the wrong way to characterize what
is needed. Accommodations presume a neutral service system that needs
adjustment to be accessible to a person with a disability, rather than a
systemic framework which is, in virtually every way, from state termination

178. See, e.g., Esme Noelle DeVault, Note, Reasonable Efforts Not So Reasonable: The
Termination of the Parental Rights of a Developmentally Disabled Mother, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS
U. L. REV. 763, 767 (2005).
179. See Watkins, supra note 169, at 1436-38.
180. In re Anthony P., 84 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1116 (2000) (quoting M.C. v. Dep’t of
Children and Families, 750 So.2d 705, 706 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000) (“dependency proceedings
are held for the benefit of the child, not the parent. Therefore, the ADA is inapplicable when
used as a defense by the parent(s) in [those] proceedings.”).
181. See Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: Standards
for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care,
and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 640-41 (1976); Arlene E. Fried,
Note, The Foster Child’s Avenues of Redress: Questions Left Unanswered, 26 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 465-66 (1993).
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statutes to the judicial proceedings themselves, built on a framework of
discriminatory assumptions about the abilities of psychiatrically disabled
women to parent, especially to parent children with special needs. As I will
argue in Section V, this framework has also been applied to parents with
physical disabilities. In that context, “accommodations” were not a viable
solution because it was societal attitudes and perceptions of physical
disability that needed to be changed.
Ultimately, what is missing from these individual termination cases is a
perception of the parent and child as part of one family, and an
understanding that preserving this family is a good and valuable goal that is
worth attempting to achieve for the benefit of all members of the family and
for the community as a whole. I have tried to show that this is because each
individual case focuses necessarily on the parent rather than on the structure
of the interlocking systems that predetermine adverse outcomes. In the next
section, I suggest that the ADA be used to confront those systems head-on.
Instead of requesting accommodations, which assumes that the systemic
framework and services are neutral and disabled people only need an
adjustment or two for the system to work for them, advocates should expose
systems as deeply and structurally discriminatory in ways that harm and
undermine families with a disabled member, especially a disabled parent.
Of course, not all parents with psychiatric disabilities can successfully
parent, with or without accommodations, any more than all non-disabled
individuals can successfully parent. But individual exceptions have never
justified a system that is structured in a discriminatory way, and the
argument of this article is that if human services—mental health systems,
child protective services systems, social services, and housing systems—
began with a goal and assumption of family preservation when any member
of the family had a psychiatric disability, the system would look very
different, and outcomes would be very different. Psychiatric disability no
more carries with it an automatic inability to parent than it does an
automatic inability to live in the community. Over the course of an
individual’s life, these prophecies of incapacity can become self-fulfilling,
but they are not and never have been innate.
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V. THE ADA’S ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS, THE INTEGRATION MANDATE,
AND FAMILY INTEGRITY
A.

The Integration Mandate and Family Preservation

The court in Homeward Bound, a class action lawsuit, recognized the
fundamental importance of keeping families together.182 In that case,
parents wanted to keep their disabled children in a family environment, but,
as the court recognized, they needed services and assistance to succeed.183
Yet this framework has largely been lost in the twenty years following
Homeward Bound, and neither the anti-discrimination provisions of the ADA
nor the integration mandate has been used as a tool to obtain services that
families need to help them stay together.
Being able to be part of a family is a distinct and crucial component of
community integration.184 As the Supreme Court noted in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees,
[f]amily relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares
not only a special community of thoughts, experiences and beliefs but also
distinctively personal aspects of one’s life. Among other things, therefore,
they are distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree
of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion
from others in critical aspects of the relationship.185

Families of origin are not the same as foster families,186 nor are they similar
to group homes.187
The Supreme Court held in Olmstead that a citizen should not have to
trade his or her liberty to receive needed health services.188 It is equally

182. Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Hissom Mem’l Ctr., No. 85-C-437-E, 1987 WL 27104, at
*17-*18 (N.D. Okla. July 24, 1987).
183. Id. at *18.
184. See generally Bonnie R. Kraemer et al., Adolescents with Severe Disabilities: Family,
School, and Community Integration, 22 J. ASS’N. FOR PERSONS WITH SEVERE HANDICAPS 224
(1997).
185. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984).
186. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845-46
(1977) (discussing “a foster family which has its source in state law and contractual
arrangements.”).
187. Wimber v. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., No. 94-4042-SAC, 1994 WL 192039, at
*11 n.8 (D. Kan. Apr. 13, 1994 ) (stating that “[t]he plaintiffs have not attempted to show that
their decision to live in a group home is in the same nature as the deep, personal decisions
and commitments associated with marriage, procreation, and raising children.”).
188. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 601 (1999) (noting that “[i]n order
to receive needed medical services, persons with mental disabilities must, because of those
disabilities, relinquish participation in community life they could enjoy given reasonable
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repugnant for parents and children to have to give up their rights to family
association in order to receive needed mental health services, yet in the
years since Joyner v. Dumpson thousands of parents had to give up custody
of their children in order for those children to receive the mental health
services that they need.189 As subsequent courts have held, the integration
mandate protects people at risk of institutionalization, and the goal of the
integration mandate is to help prevent unnecessary institutionalization and
isolation as well as end it where it exists.190
This article argues that keeping families together is, necessarily, a key
component of the integration mandate. Research shows that if families
receive the services that they need, the chances that those children will be
institutionalized or placed out of the home in segregated residential
placements is greatly reduced.191 Although there is less research on the
benefits of home-based services to the family when the disabled family
member is the parent, both research and program results also tend to
indicate that families are more likely to stay together when family support is
provided in the community.192 Mothers with mental illness have identified
being able to parent their children as a primary motivating factor for
treatment,193 while also expressing hesitation to access available treatment
because of fears that their children will be removed.194
Psychiatrically disabled mothers describe termination proceedings, the
risk of removal, court proceedings, and removal of their children as
inordinately stressful, an indication of fundamental personal failure, and
crisis of enormous proportions which often precipitates deterioration and

accommodations, while persons without mental disabilities can receive the medical services
they need without similar sacrifice.”).
189. Weithorn, supra note 11, at 1375; see also Goodman, supra note 11; Simmons,
supra note 11.
190. See Radaszewski ex rel. Radaszewski v. Maram, 383 F.3d 599, 607-08 (7th Cir.
2004); Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 332-33 (3d Cir. 1995).
191. Editorial, Unkept Promises to the State’s Disabled, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Nov.
10, 2002, at 2; Goodman, supra note 11, at 324-25.
192. See generally Joanne Nicholson et al., A Qualitative Study of Programs for Parents
with Serious Mental Illness and Their Children: Building Practice-Based Evidence, 34 J. BEHAV.
HEALTH SERVS. & RES. 395 (2007) [hereinafter Nicholson et al., A Qualitative Study].
193. Carol T. Mowbray et al., Motherhood for Women with Serious Mental Illness:
Pregnancy, Childbirth, and the Postpartum Period, 65 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 21, 21 (1995)
[hereinafter Mowbray et al., Motherhood for Women with Serious Disabilities]; APFEL &
HANDEL, supra note 14, at 4-5, 160-61.
194. Mowbray et al., Motherhood for Women with Serious Mental Illness, supra note 193,
at 33; Dale Russakoff, A Failed Mother Returns to Her Children, WASH. POST, Jan. 20 1998,
at A1.
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hospitalization.195 In one parental termination case, the caseworker noted
that
‘[f]irst, it appears that much of the mother’s inappropriate and angry
outbursts have been due to her being separated from the minor . . . [s]he
has never been abusive to the minor . . . the mother copes very poorly
under stress, and both the [c]ourt process as well as being separated from
her child have put her under tremendous pressure and stress, and appear to
have escalated her mental health problems.’196

The caseworker, who had previously recommended reunification,
recommended that the child not be returned home until “these issues
subside.”197
As the cases described above illustrate, the story of institutionalized
people is so often the story of people separated from their families: grieving
angry women who have lost their children, and insecure adolescents who
bounced from one foster home to the other before winding up in residential
care.
In order to fully integrate individuals with psychiatric disabilities into
every day community life, they must be seen, as is already the case with
most physically disabled people, as capable of playing all potential roles in
a family: not only children, but husbands and wives, mothers and fathers,
grandparents, aunts and uncles—the essential components of the family
unit, which is in turn, one of the essential building blocks of community.
Until this is the case, people with psychiatric disabilities will be “isolated”
even if they are deinstitutionalized; in the community but not part of it,
hangers-on who peer into the warm windows of family life at the heart of
community, but do not have a place at the table inside.
B.

The Fundamental Discriminatory Framework of the Human Services and
Legal Systems With Regard to Parents with Psychiatric Disabilities

The understanding of people with psychiatric disabilities as “almost
genderless,”198 unsuitable to marry, unable to parent, and not even much
use as siblings, is a legacy of the days of institutionalization and is a
discriminatory stereotype which is embedded in state statutes, the practices
of mental health agencies, the attitudes of social service professionals, the
services provided by social services agencies, and in the court system.

195. See Mowbray et al., Motherhood for Women with Serious Mental Illness, supra note
193, at 33-34.
196. In re Kristin H. v. Kimberly I., 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1645-46 (1996).
197. Id. at 1646.
198. Mary Ann Test & Sharon B. Berlin, Issues of Special Concern to Chronically Mentally
Ill Women, 12 PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOL. 136, 136 (1981).
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The first step is transforming this situation for advocates is to step back
and conduct a multi-system analysis of the structural impediments and
barriers to keeping families together when one member has a psychiatric
disability in their own state’s human service systems.
1. State Statutes
Far from requiring reasonable accommodations for psychiatric
disabilities, a number of state parental termination statutes refer explicitly to
diagnoses of mental illness or mental health conditions to expedite
termination proceedings or limit the participation of parents with psychiatric
disabilities.199 For example, in many states, the statutory requirement that
reunification services be provided does not apply if the reason for
termination is the parent’s mental illness.200 In some states the services
need not be provided if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent is suffering from a mental disability as defined by statute
“that renders him or her incapable of utilizing those services”,201 a
requirement that does not include the reasonable accommodation
provisions of federal antidiscrimination law.
As discussed previously, some states still have statutes requiring some
form of parental relinquishment of rights in order for children to obtain
needed mental health treatment. While New York, where Joyner v.
Dumpson was brought, has made substantial steps to provide family-based
services, many other states lag far behind, and even states with statutes
banning permanent relinquishment of custody in exchange for mental health
services still permit a requirement of temporary relinquishment of custody to
receive services.202
2. Mental Health Agency Policies and Practices
Mental health agencies erase the reality that many of their clients are
parents, or even that they could have satisfying sexual, romantic, and
parental relationships. In fact, the vast majority of mental health agencies
199. ELIZABETH LIGHTFOOT ET AL., UNIV. OF MINN., GUIDE FOR CREATING LEGISLATIVE
CHANGE: DISABILITY IN THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND OTHER CHILD CUSTODY
STATUTES 2, available at http://cehd.umn.edu/SSW/cascw/attributes/PDF/Legislative
Change.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2009) (finding that thirty six states list mental illness as a
ground for termination of parental rights); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-533(B)(3) (West 2008);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1(D)(p) (West 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(3)(a)
(West 2008).
200. In re Custody and Guardianship of La’Asia S., 739 N.Y.S.2d 898, 908 (Fam. Ct.
N.Y. County 2002).
201. In re A.O. v. Diane O., No. E039235, 2006 WL 872767, at *7 (Ct. App. Cal. Apr.
5, 2006) (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(b)(2) (2006)).
202. Goodman, supra note 11, at 328.
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have no idea which of their clients are parents, and eighty percent of them
have no policies on pregnant clients or clients who are parents.203 Most
state psychiatric facilities do not permit children to visit their parents.204 A
recent survey revealed that not one mental health agency had a visitation
policy for hospitalized mothers and their children.205 Most group homes
and community residential settings do not permit residents to marry or
cohabit, and certainly not to live with children.206 Mental health agencies
rarely include pregnancy and postpartum assistance as part of the services
that they provide, let alone parenting assistance207 or help in planning for
temporary placement of their children if the mother should have to be
hospitalized.208 Mental health agencies often take the position that
parenting assistance is a function of social service agencies,209 but social
service agencies are generally only involved after a complaint has been
made that parenting is inadequate.210 State mental health agencies vary
widely in terms of the family-oriented services that they provide to clients
with psychiatric disabilities.211
3. Mental Health and Social Service Professionals’ Attitudes
Mental health professionals are also notoriously judgmental about the
abilities of people with psychiatric disabilities to parent: study after study,
from Deborah Le Belle’s classic Lives in Stress, to more recent work, reflects
that mothers with psychiatric disabilities are hesitant to seek mental health
services because of their fear that their children will be removed.212
203. Biebel et al., supra note 32, at 31-32.
204. See Diana M. C. Cassell, Mother and Baby Admissions: Survey of Resources, 14
PSYCHIATRIC BULL., 654, 654 (1990) (stating that thirty years ago, some hospitals had
programs where mothers could be hospitalized with their children); Andrea K. Blanch et al.,
Parents with Severe Mental Illness and Their Children: The Need for Human Services
Integration, in WOMEN’S MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES: A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 201, 201
(Bruce Lubotsky Levin et al. eds., 1998).
205. Biebel et al., supra note 32, at 32.
206. APFEL & HANDEL, supra note 14, at 161.
207. Mowbray et al., Motherhood for Women with Serious Mental Illness, supra note 193,
at 21; Daphna Oyserman et al., Resources and Supports for Mothers with Severe Mental
Illness, 19 HEALTH & SOC. WORK 132, 134 (1994).
208. See, e.g., Nicholson et al., A Qualitative Study, supra note 192, at 202; Joanne
Nicholson & Andrea Blanch, Rehabilitation for Parenting Roles for People with Serious Mental
Illness, 18 PSYCHOSOCIAL REHAB. JOURNAL 109 (1994); J. Nicholson et al., “Sylvia Frumkin”
Has a Baby: A Case Study for Policy Makers, 47 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 497 (1996).
209. Blanch et al., supra note 204, at 202; Nicholson et al., The Prevalence of
Parenthood, supra note 20, at 130-31.
210. Blanch et al., supra note 204, at 202.
211. Id. at 202-03.
212. Id. at 206; see also Deborah Belle et al., Mental Health Problems and Their
Treatment, in LIVES IN STRESS: WOMEN AND DEPRESSION 197, 201 (Deborah Belle ed., 1982).
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Hundreds of individual termination cases confirm that the person calling
child protective services is often the parent’s mental health case worker or
other mental health professional.213 Even when mental health workers do
not act to remove the child from the parent’s custody, they often discourage
parenting rather than take steps to assist the parent:
One mother, Lindy Fox, who later became a researcher into the needs of
parents with mental illnesses, describes how her early treatment providers
viewed her children as major stressors. Rather than offering her parenting
education and family-centered treatment, her counselors encouraged her to
believe that she could not cope with parenting. Likewise, her husband was
given no education about her disease, and her marriage fell apart. Fox
reports:
I feel that I was pressured by my treatment providers to give up the care
of my children . . . . Early on, there should have been education about
mental illness for me and my family. Keeping the family unit intact
should have been a primary goal . . . . Instead of being convinced I
couldn’t cope, I needed support and encouragement to care for them. I
needed someone to believe I could do it. Regular day care for the
children and someone coming into my home to help when the girls were
small were possibilities that were not even considered . . . . Ongoing
family treatment should be part of every treatment plan for mothers with
a mental illness, with an emphasis on developing parenting skills,
communication skills, problem-solving skills, and ability to manage
stress.214

The degree to which many professionals believe that individuals with
psychiatric disabilities are committed to retaining their children is illustrated
by the perspective one professional took in explaining one mother’s
complete compliance with court orders and her determination to retain her
parental rights:
During the termination proceeding, Dr. Wunderman [a clinical psychologist]
opined that the mother was ‘addicted’ to the termination proceeding, and
that she had completed the required parenting course, visited her children at
the scheduled times, and appeared in court ‘[a]s a means of escaping a
feeling of tremendous emptiness, tremendous loneliness, tremendous
nothingness that the borderline personality disorder does feel.’215

213. Blanch et al., supra note 204, at 207.
214. Glennon, supra note 20, at 293-94.
215. Simms v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 641 So.2d 957, 962 n.2 (Fla.App.3d
1994).
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The mother in this case lost her parental rights despite completely complying
with the agency’s plans and scheduled court appearances because her very
compliance was framed as a symptom of her mental illness.216
For twenty to thirty years, child protection workers and agencies had
similar views of people with physical disabilities: fathers in wheelchairs
couldn’t be fathers because they couldn’t play baseball with their children or
provide for their needs.217 These perspectives were shared by the judges
who heard the termination cases and adoption cases. As Laura Rothstein
pointed out, each disability came with its own presumptions,218
presumptions so strong that even when a deaf mute couple had successfully
parented their own children, a judge ordered that the application “of these
poor unfortunate people” to adopt a child be refused because the child
deserved a “normal” home.219 In a later case, parents who were HIVpositive had to fight to keep their children.220 In 2009, most of these
scenarios strike us as wrong-headed and almost absurd. The agencies in
those cases did not think in terms of what accommodations might be
needed to assist physically disabled individuals to parent, because they
didn’t think that physically disabled people should be parenting in the first
place. People with psychiatric disabilities continue to face a presumption of
incapacity to parent in 2009, and requesting reasonable accommodations
from agencies and judges who don’t think they should be parenting in the
first place runs up against the same obstacles.
4. Social Service and Family Service Agency Framework and Service
Structure
Family service and child protection agencies rarely have services tailored
to the needs of people with psychiatric disabilities, even though such

216. Id. at 962.
217. In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 37, 40 (Cal. 1979) (reversing lower court
decision removing custody of children from father in a wheelchair because he couldn’t play
baseball with them or take them fishing).
218. LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, RIGHTS OF PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED PERSONS 185-87 (1984).
219. See Stein, supra note 28, at 1083-84; see also Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presumptions
of Justice: Law, Politics, and the Mentally Retarded Parent, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1240
(1990).
220. See, e.g., Carol Levine, AIDS and Changing Concepts of Family, 68 MILBANK Q.
(Supplement 1) 33, 50-51 (1990) (discussing a father’s custody battle in which his HIVpositive status was at issue); Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956, 959, 965 (Ind. Ct. App.
1988); see Meriweather v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 255 S.W.3d 505, 506-08 (Ark.
App. 2007) (finding that woman with mental retardation who “completed the lion’s share of
the case plan” and who cared for her diabetic mother was not a fit parent; noting also that
her arthritis made it difficult for her to hold the child).
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individuals form a substantial proportion of the parents they see.221 Nor do
these agencies have employees with expertise in psychiatric or
developmental disability conditions, and usually a social worker does not
have a clear understanding of basic mental health issues such as how
psychiatric medications may affect an individual.222 This lack of education
and understanding may also translate into stereotypical assumptions that an
individual with a psychiatric disability cannot parent, although it is not clear
that mental health professionals do not also share some of these
stereotypes.
Family service workers and judges are also largely unaware of social
science research on the harm caused by taking children out of their families
and placing them in foster care. It is a harm so great that a matched study
of “crack babies,” which compared newborns placed in foster care with
newborns allowed to stay with their mothers, showed that “at six months of
age, the infants left in foster care were significantly less likely to reach, roll
over or sit up than those left with their mothers.”223
5. State Court Prejudice and Stereotypes
Education of state court judges should be one of the top priorities of
advocates trying to keep families together when one member has a
disability. It is worth listing a number of false stereotypes reflected in lower
court decisions and termination filings that also permeate the attitudes of
child protective services workers and the agencies where they operate:
* Psychiatric disability and symptoms are permanent and unchanging;224
* Requiring assistance to parent means unfitness to parent;

221. See Duncan McLean et al., Are Services for Families with a Mentally Ill Parent
Adequate?, in PARENTAL PSYCHIATRIC DISORDER: DISTRESSED PARENTS AND THEIR FAMILIES 333,
338-39 (Michael Göpfert et al. eds., 2d. ed. 2004) (discussing that eighty-eight percent of
agency service providers report that services for parents with psychiatric disorders and their
children are inadequate).
222. Id. at 339 (“Lack of knowledge and expertise was perceived as a significant barrier by
slightly less than half (46%) of service providers.”).
223. Kathleen Wobie et al., To Have and To Hold: A Descriptive Study of Custody Status
Following Prenatal Exposure to Cocaine, (paper presented at joint annual meeting of the
American Pediatric Society and the Society for Pediatric Research, May 3, 1998).
224. See In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d 93, 102 (Mo. 2007) (reversing the decision of the lower
court which had terminated parental rights based, inter alia, on the assumption that the
mother’s bipolar disorder was permanent); see also Benedict v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 242
S.W.3d 305, 317 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d, No. CA 08-268, 2008 WL 2515678, at *1
(Ark. App. Ct. June 25, 2008) (discussing a woman diagnosed with post partum psychosis
who won appellate argument to regain custody of her children only to lose her children
permanently after suffering one further episode of psychosis).
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* Being disrespectful to the social worker means unfitness to parent; and
* Attempting suicide means unfitness to parent.

6. Outline of Remedies
Although the problems discussed above are pervasive and fundamental,
they have also been recognized for many years. Thoughtful people have
put together detailed solutions, which, not coincidentally, mirror the
requirements of the ADA.225 In New York State over a decade ago, the
Department of Social Services (DSS) and the Office of Mental Health (OMH)
created a joint task force on parents with mental illness.226 The Task Force
included professionals from both systems, consumers, researchers,
advocates, providers, and members of local government.227 After compiling
data and taking testimony at public hearings, the Task Force recommended,
among other approaches, to: “[d]evelop ‘family services’ that do not divide
adults from children”, “[i]ncrease capacity for in-home services”, “increase
capacity for off-hour services (not just crisis)”, “[p]rovide flexible respite
services”, “[e]ducate parents and children regarding mental illness”,
“[t]arget public day care slots for children of mentally ill parents”, and
“[i]ncrease staff competencies for both DSS and OMH staff”.228
The Task Force recommended that the OMH include parenting
programs and day care as part of its outpatient programs, that mental
health outpatient providers “develop linkages with family support services”,
that parental status and needs be added to mental health data forms and
treatment plans, that visitation be established for hospitalized parents, and
that its supported housing and residential programs include as a matter of
The Task Force also
course housing for parents with children.229
recommended that DSS revise its intake and eligibility policies “to ensure
sensitivity to the needs and capacities of parents” with psychiatric
As the Task Force recognized, however, interagency
disabilities.230
coordination remained a serious and ongoing problem.231
One interesting aspect of the recommendations made by the New York
Task Force is how similar many of them are to the programs instituted by the

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
Blanch et al., supra note 204, at 203.
Id.
Id. at 209 tbl.1.
Id. at 211.
Id.
Blanch et al., supra note 204, at 213.
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court in Homeward Bound v. Hissom described previously in this article.232 It
is not the case that we do not know, and have not known for over twenty
years, what services are necessary to keep families together when one
member has a disability. Instead, we are unwilling to adjust our belief that
these families shouldn’t be together, that splitting these families is ultimately
a favor to the child who can be raised “normally” and the parent who is
being asked to do more than his or her disability will permit. To transform
these multiple systems may seem daunting. Yet no one disagrees that
coordinating systems of care provides better and more efficient services, and
services delivered to families are less expensive and have better outcomes
than removing disabled family members from the home and paying for
expensive and unnecessary residential care.
Advocates can pursue one of several kinds of systemic cases. First, a
challenge to state policies requiring parents to relinquish custody of their
mentally disabled children in order to receive necessary services for them,
framed in terms of Section 504 and Olmstead, that only parents of children
with psychiatric disabilities are required to surrender parental and
associational rights in order for their children to receive services that the
state already provides.233 Second, a systemic challenge in a state with a
statute precluding parents with psychiatric disabilities from receiving
reunification services provided to other parents, framed on behalf of families
in which one or more members of the family is a client of a state mental
health agency, where the family is at risk of dissolution and one or more
family members is at risk of institutionalization because of the absence of
family-based services that the mental health agency has reason to know that
the family needs. A case brought against multiple systems by a class of
families is complex, to be sure, but it has at least a chance of creating
change, unlike the individual appeals to the ADA in single parental
termination proceedings. As discussed previously, in a significant number of
cases both parents and children will suffer from psychiatric or emotional
disabilities, and in the absence of services received as a family, either or
both parents and children are greatly at risk of institutionalization,
segregation, and losing family ties that both children and parents cherish
and need.

232. See Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Hissom Mem’l Ctr., No. 85-C-437-E, 1987 WL
27104, at *33, *35, *36 (N.D. Okla. July 24, 1987); supra notes 103-115 and
accompanying text.
233. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 338 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting H.R. REP. 485, 101st
Cong., as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 473, (emphasis added)).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The psychiatric disability of one family member profoundly affects all
family members, and the best services and supports are those that are
provided to the family as a whole. Hence the title of my article: a family
with one or more mentally disabled members is, by definition, an
accommodating family, one that has made accommodations, however
imperfect, to ensure the inclusion and participation of the parent, child, or
sibling with a disability in the family. A significant and surprising body of
research shows that when families struggle to stay together, even when the
mother has serious emotional or substance abuse problems, the children
often fare significantly better than children who are removed from their
homes.234 As the writings of families where one member has a disability
reflect, families—parents and children alike—are often more successful at
accommodating disabilities than might be imagined. But it would help
these families if society accommodated them, too. As advocates, service
providers, and policymakers, we need to start thinking more about
accommodating families, about family integration as the first building block
of community integration. As the Supreme Court recognized in Olmstead,
the fundamental damage of segregation is exclusion from the normal
activities of community life.235 Families are at the very core of community
life, and until the ADA is used successfully to protect families, its promise will
be incomplete.

234. See Danson Jones et al., When Parents with Severe Mental Illness Lose Contact with
Their Children: Are Psychiatric Symptoms or Substance Use to Blame?, 13 J. LOSS & TRAUMA
261, 262 (2008) (discussing that children who are separated or removed from their parents
often suffer from psychiatric illness such as depression, feelings of rejection, and anxiety).
235. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 583 (1999).
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